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Admissibility of Expert Testimony at Summary Judgment in
Louisiana: Examining the Embers of Independent Fire'
Insurance Co. v. Sunbeam Corp.
The interplay between advances in modem technology and expanding
notions of tort law has spurred a sharp rise in the use of expert testimony in trials
in the past two decades.' This increase has been so dramatic that some scholars
have declared that the American judicial hearing is becoming "trial by expert."2
Not surprisingly, parties seeking to extinguish litigation by moving for summary
judgment have sought to capitalize on the "trial by expert" trend by supporting
such a motion with affidavits and depositions from experts.3 Federal courts have
traditionally admitted expert testimony in support of motions for summary
judgment.4 Louisiana circuit courts, however, have resisted allowing this type of
evidence at summary judgment stage.5 The issue did not squarely reach the
Louisiana Supreme Court until last year.
In Independent Fire Insurance Co. v. Sunbeam Corp.,6 the Louisiana
Supreme Court considered the admissibility of expert opinion testimony in
summary judgment proceedings. Noting that the redactors of the Louisiana Code
of Evidence patterned the articles after the Federal Rules of Evidence,7 the court
overruled a number of circuit decisions excluding expert opinion evidence and
instead adopted the federal rule.' The standard announced in Independent Fire
requires that a trial judge admit expert testimony produced at summary judgment
stage if the evidence would be admissible at trial.9
This casenote examines the holding in Independent Fire as well as the
implications of the new rule. Part I surveys the relevant provisions of the Louisiana
Copyright 2001, by LoUIsIANA LAW REvIEW
1. Frank L Maraist, Evidence and Proof § 11.3, at 196 in 19 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1999); 1 Charles McCormick, McCormick on Evidence §13, at 23 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed.).
2. William T. Pizzi, Expert Testimony in the U.S,, 145 New L J. 82 (1995).
3. See e.g., McCoy v. Physicians & Surgeons Hospital; 452 So. 2d 308, 309 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1984) (defendant supported motion for summary judgment with deposition of neurosurgeon and
affidavit of neurologist).
4. See, e.g., Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993)
(applying the rule of expert testimony admissibility used at trial to a motion for summary judgment);
First United Financial Corp. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 96 F. 3d 135, 136-37 (5th Cir. 1996)
(poting that the "admissibility of expert testimony is governed by the same rules, whether at trial or on
summary judgment").
5. See, e.g., Harris v. Landry, 734 So. 2d I (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998) (holding that neither
affidavits nor depositions of experts were admissible at summary judgment stage); Bockman v.
Caraway, 691 So. 2d 815 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997) (holding that expert affidavits produced at summary
judgment are inadmissible); Ivy v. Freeland, 576 So. 2d 1117 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991) (holding that
expert depositions were inadmissible at summaryjudgment); Weston v. Raymond Corp., 531 So. 2d 528
(La App. 5th Cir. 1988), writ denied, 533 So. 2d 360 (La. 1988) (holding that expert affidavits were
inadmissible in support of motion for summaryjudgment). But see Richoux v. Tulane Medical Ctr., 6i 7
So. 2d 13 (La. App. 4th Cir 1993) (admitting expert testimony of medical review panel).
6. 755 So. 2d 226 (La. 2000).
7. Id. at 234.
8. Id. at 237.
9. Id.
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Code of Civil Procedure and the Louisiana Code of Evidence, comparing them to
their counterparts in the federal system. Part I also explores the confusion of the
lower courts prior to Independent Fire and summarizes the federal rule of law on
admissibility of expert testimony at summary judgment. Part II discusses the
majority opinion in Independent Fire, focusing on the decision's (1) adherence to
legislative intent, (2) principle of deference to federal evidence law, (3) effect on
the judicial economy, (4) accordance with fairness, and (5) impact on the trial
court's Daubert-Foret analysis. This casenote approves the decision on a whole
while noting that this change in the law comes with a price.
I. INDEPENDENTFIRE-THE SETTING
A. Facts and Procedural History of Independent Fire
Independent Fire is a classic example of the relationship between expert
opinion testimony and the motion for summary judgment. Often the trier of fact
can only comfortably determine an issue of causation with the aid of scientific or
technical expert testimony. In such cases, the admission (or denial) of expert
testimony, in support of or opposition to a motion for summary judgment,
potentially determines the success or failure of the motion.
Independent Fire involved a suit for damages resulting from a fire that severely
damaged the home of Mr. and Mrs. Nary Cannon.' On September 19, 1992, a fire
started in Cannon's propane barbecue grill, which was manufactured by Sunbeam
Corporation ("Sunbeam"). The fire spread to plaintiffs' home causing damage. The
grill contained an undercarriage rack designed for storage. Two propane tanks
rested on the rack. The first tank, manufactured by Sunbeam, was connected to the
grill and in use at the time the fire started. The other, a spare tank manufactured by
Char-Broil, was not in use at the time of the fire. Although Mr. Cannon could not
specifically remember when or where he refilled the spare tank, he stated that he
routinely filled his tanks at Jenkins Shell Service Station ("Jenkins Shell"). Cannon
did, however, recall that he had used the spare tank several times since last refilling
it.H
Immediately prior to the accident, Mr. Cannon had cooked hamburgers on his
grill, which was located inside an enclosed patio. When finished cooking, he turned
the heat selection knob to "clean mode" and went inside his home. Shortly
thereafter, he heard a loud hissing sound coming from the grill area. Looking out
the patio door, Cannon saw flames spewing from the Sunbeam gas tank and up the
wall. He went to a neighbor's house and called for help. Cannon returned to view
the fire from a location outside the patio and saw that the flames were still coming
from the Sunbeam tank.
10. Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 733 So. 2d 743,744-45 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1999),
rev'd, 755 So. 2d 226 (La. 2000).
11. Independent Fire Ins. Co., 755 So. 2d at 228.
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The Cannons and their homeowners' insurer, Independent Fire Insurance
Company, brought suit against Sunbeam under the Louisiana Products Liability
Act. They alleged that an unreasonably dangerous and/or defective condition of the
grill or Sunbeam propane tank caused the fire. In response, Sunbeam filed a third
party demand against Jenkins Shell alleging that Jenkins Shell overfilled the spare
Char-Broil tank. Jenkins Shell filed a motion for summaryjudgment, asserting that
plaintiffs produced no evidence indicating that Jenkins Shell overfiled the spare
tank; and, in the alternative, even if the spare tank was overfilled, eyewitness
testimony established that the Char-Broil tank was not cause-in-fact of the fire; and
that no evidence suggested that plaintiffs' property damage was proximately caused
by an act of Jenkins Shell. 2 In support of its motion for summary judgment,
Jenkins Shell offered the depositions of Mr. Cannon and Mr. Otha Ray Jenkins of
Jenkins Shell. Mr. Jenkins testified that he did not remember filling the spare Char-
Broil tank. Mr. Jenkins also stated that his propane facility had state-inspected
equipment and that he received proper training on filling propane tanks." Jenkins
Shell also produced the reports of three expert witnesses and portions of their
depositions. Fred Liebkemann, a mechanical engineer, opined in his expert report
that propane gas discharged by the Sunbeam tank caused the fire. He further
concluded, based on his examination of the Jenkins Shell facility and Cannon's
eyewitness testimony, that the spare Char-Broil tank had not been overfilled.
Another engineer, Harold Myers, agreed that the fire originated from gas escaping
from the Sunbeam tank. Finally, Randall Bruff, an investigator for the INS
Investigative Bureau, maintained that the most likely cause of the fire was a defect
in the hose line connected to the Sunbeam tank. 4
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs and Sunbeam
produced the expert report and partial deposition of William Baynes, the director
of engineering services for. Sunbeam. Based on tests performed on equipment
similar to plaintiffs' propane grill, Baynes concluded that, contrary to Mr. Cannon's
eyewitness testimony, it was not possible that the flames came from the operating
Sunbeam tank. In Bayne's opinion the only possible source of the flames was an
overfilled spare tank."
Following a hearing, the trial court granted Jenkins Shell's motion for summary
judgment.16 The court of appeal affirmed, 7 but held that the trial court could not
12. Independent Fire Ins. Co., 733 So. 2d at 745.
13. Independent Fire Ins. Co., 755 So. 2d at 228.
14. Id. at 229.
15. Id.
16. The trial court orally offered the following rationale:
There is no fact I can find anywhere that indicates that Mr. Jenkins overfilled the tank.... In
fact, everything is to the contrary, that there was nothing shown that he overfilled the tank....
[T]here is nothing that indicates that Mr. Bains [sic]... did anything to show or based his
opinion on any facts that had to do with exactly what happened at Jenkins Service Station
as to the filling of the tank.... From what I see, I think the motion for summaryjudgment is
well founded.
Id.
17. Independent Fire Ins. Co., 733 So. 2d at 747.
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consider the expert opinions at the summary judgment stage.'" Nevertheless, the
court of appeal concluded that plaintiffs and Sunbeam failed to produce evidence
sufficient to prove all the elements of their negligence claims against Jenkins
Shell.' 9
B. "Certworthiness" of Independent Fire
Understanding why writs were granted in Independent Fire begins with an
examination of the relevant articles of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure and
the Louisiana Code of Evidence, the corresponding Federal Rules, the inconsistent
views of Louisiana's appellate courts prior to Independent Fire, and the relevant
federal jurisprudence. A study of these materials reveals that federal and state
summary judgment legislation, while textually similar, has been interpreted
differently.
1. Overview of Summary Judgment and Expert Testimony Legislation
If one of the parties to litigation can demonstrate by affidavits, depositions, and
an opponent's admissions that a case presents no genuine issue of material fact,"
the trial court may render judgment as a matter of law through a procedure known
as summary judgment.2' The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides for
summary judgment in Article 966, in particular that a motion for summary
judgment shall be granted "ifthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law."22 In recent years, the Legislature and the Judiciary have battled over the
standard applicable in summary judgment proceedings. Before 1996, Louisiana
courts granted summary judgment "cautiously and sparingly.""3 During that time,
courts favored trial on the merits. 4 However, in 1996 the Legislature amended
Article 966 to provide that "summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."2" The revision added
that the procedure is "favored"2 6 and that a motion which shows that there is no
genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law shall be granted." Finally, the amendment stated, "[n]otwithstanding
18. Id. at 746-47.
19. Independent Fire Ins. Co., 755 So. 2d at 230.
20. This includes any mixed question of fact and law.
21. 1 Frank L Maraist & Harry T. Lemmon, Civil Procedure § 6.8, at 139 in 1 Louisiana Civil
Law Treatise (1999).
22. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(B) (1984).
23. Maraist & Laemmon, supra note 21, § 6.8, at 140 (quoting Riviere v. Bethard, 422 So. 2d 1341
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1982)).
24. Id. (citing, Blount v. Exxon Corp, 395 So. 2d 355 (La. App. ist Cir. 1981)).
25. La. Code Civ. P. art966(A)(2), added by La. Acts 1996, Ist Ex. Sess.,No. 9, § I.
26. Id.
27. La. Code Civ. P. art 966(C), added by La. Acts 1996, ist Ex. Sess., No. 9, § 1.
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any other provision of this Article to the contrary, the burden of proof shall remain
with the mover."'28
The purpose of the 1996 amendment was to incorporate into Louisiana
jurisprudence the holding of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,29 a United States Supreme
Court case which adopted a liberal summary judgment standard.3 ° However, despite
the design of the 1996 amendment, most Louisiana circuit courts held that the
amendment did not represent a change in the burden ofproof in a summary judgment
proceeding." The sole exception was Hayes v. Autin,32 which declared that the
amendment "levels the playing field"'33 between the two parties to a motion for
summary judgment in two ways: (1) the supporting documentation submitted by the
parties should be scrutinized equally and (2) the overriding presumption in favor of
a trial on the merits is removed. 4 However, when it became apparent that Hayes only
reflected a minority view amongst the appellate courts, the Legislature again amended
Article 966. The 1997 amendment repealed a portion of the 1996 amendment" and
added specific instructions to the courts for deciding motions for summary judgment:
The burden of proof remains with the movant However, if the movant will
not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on
the motion for summary judgment, the movant's burden on the motion does
not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim,
action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court that there is an absence
of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's
claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce
factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his
evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material
fact.36
The amending act declared a purpose in part-to "clarify" the 1996 amendments and
"to legislatively overrule all cases inconsistent with Hayes v. Austin."'
The current form of Article 966 closely resembles the federal jurisprudential
rule in Celotex.3  First, it places the burden of producing evidence at summary
28. La. Code Civ. P. art 966(G), added by La. Acts 1996, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 9, § 1, repealed by
La. Acts 1997, No. 483 § 3.
29. • 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. CL 2548 (1986) (interpreting Fed. & Civ. P. 56 not to favor a trial on
the merits, but to mandate summary judgment against a party who fails to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial).
30. Maraist & Lemmon, supra note 21, § 6.8, at 147.
31. Id. (citing, e.g., McKey v. General Motors Corp., 691 So. 2d 164 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997);
Short v. Griffin, 682 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996), writ. denied, 689 So. 2d 1372 (La. 1997)).
32. 685 So. 2d 691 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996), writ denied, 690 So. 2d 41 (La. 1997).
33. Hayes, 685 So. 2d at 694.
34. Id.
35. La. Acts 1997, No. 483 § 3.
36. La. Code Civ. P. art 966(C), added by La. Acts 1996, 1 st Ex. Sess., No. 9.
37. La. Acts 1996, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 9, § 1.
38. Maraist & Lemmon, supra note 21, § 6.8, at 147; see also Hary, 744 So. 2d at 694 (,[T]he
amendment to Art. 966 brings Louisiana's standard for summary judgment closely in line with the
federal standard.").
20011
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judgment upon the moving party.39 The moving party can meet this burden by
"submitting affidavits or by 'point[ing) out' the lack of factual support for an essential
element in the opponent's case." Second, it requires the party shouldering the burden
of persuasion at trial to produce evidence showing that the burden at trial will be met.
41
At this point, the trial judge determines whether or not the motion should be granted.
Because the ultimate burden remains with the moving party, if the evidence creates a
genuine issue of material fact the judge should deny the motion.42
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 967 supplements the summary judgment
procedure provided in Article 966 by describing the type of documentation admissible
in support of, or in opposition to, a motion for summaryjudgment.43 Article 967, which
mirrors Federal Rule 56(e),44 requires that supporting and opposing affidavits (1) be
made on personal knowledge, (2) set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and (3) show affirmatively that the afliant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein. This article-particularly its requirement that affidavits be made "on
personal knowledge"--poses the most consistent obstacle to the admissibility of expert
opinion testimony in support of or opposition to a motions for summary judgment4
Finally, Louisiana Code of Evidence article 702 and Federal Rule of Evidence 702
are identical in providing that witnesses who qualify as experts may testify without
firsthand knowledge of the facts if their knowledge will assist the trier of fact in
understanding the evidence or determining a fact at issue.46 It would seem that both
Article 702 and Rule 702 relax the requirement of firsthand knowledge based upon a
helpfulness standard.
2. Split in the Courts
Prior to Independent Fire, Louisiana's appellate courts disagreed as to whether
expert opinion testimony was admissible at sunmary judgment stage.47 Most circuits
39. Maraist & Lemmon, supra note 21, § 6.8, at 147.
40. Id. at 148.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. La. Code Civ. P. art. 967 (1984).
44. La. Code Civ. P. art 967 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) both provide in pertinent part:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to
the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or by further affidavits. (emphasis
added)
45. See infra Part I.B.2.
46. La. Code Evid. art. 702 and Fed. I Evid 702 both provide in full:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.
47. Maraist & Lemmon, supra note 21, § 6.8, at 143.
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did not consider expert opinion evidence at summary judgment hearings.4" The
first circuit adhered to the majority position prohibiting expert testimony at
summary judgment in Independent Fire." There, the court held that Code of
Civil Procedure article 967 requires that expert affidavits in support of a summary
judgment be based on personal knowledge.50 According to the first circuit,
statements of an expert as to his professional opinion or belief, based upon his
special training and experience, do not meet the requirement of "personal
knowledge.5' Thus, expert opinion testimony presented through an affidavit did
not qualify as proper support for a motion for summary judgment.52 The first
circuit initially applied the same standard of exclusion to expert depositions.53
However, that court overruled the jurisprudence excluding depositions in
Simmons v. Berry.4 After Berry, expert opinion evidence, which would be
excluded under Article 967 if submitted by affidavit, was admissible at a
summary judgment hearing if submitted by deposition.55
The third circuit adopted a similar rule, that expert opinions, in the form of
affidavits or depositions not based on firsthand observation, failed to meet the
admissibility standards of Article 967.56 Likewise, the fifth circuit embraced the
majority view, disallowing expert opinion testimony in the form of affidavits and
depositions at summary judgment." The second circuit has been less consistent
in its treatment of the issue of admissibility of expert opinion evidence at
summary judgment.5" Some decisions held that affidavits or depositions based
on expert opinion were not admissible under Article 967 in support of or
opposition to a motion for summary judgment.59 However, other recent second
48. See sources cited supra note 5.
49. Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 733 So. 2d 743, 746 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1999),
rev'd, 755 So. 2d 226 (La. 2000)
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. (citing Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 619 So. 2d 111, 114 (La. App. lstCir. 1993).
53. See Miceli v. Armstrong World Indus., 691 So. 2d 283, 290 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997).
54. 748 So. 2d 473 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1999) (en banc).
55. Id. at 477.
56. See Read v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 725 So. 2d 85 (La. App. 3d Cir 1998) (holding
that affidavits containing expert opinion testimony does not meet the article 967 personal knowledge
requirement); Duhon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 720 So. 2d 117 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1998) (holding that
expert depositions which contain opinion not based on personal knowledge are not admissible at
summary judgment).
57. See McElreath v. Progressive Ins. Co., 596 So. 2d 693 (La. App 5th Cir. 1992) writ denied,
596 So. 2d 693 (La. 1992) (holding that opinions of an expert based on special training and experience
do not meet the personal knowledge requirement of article 967); Weston v. Raymond Corp., 531 So. 2d
528 (La App. 5th Cir. 1988), writ denied, 533 So. 2d 360 (La. 1988) (holding that expert affidavits were
inadmissible in support of motion for summary judgment).
58. Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam, Corp., 755 So. 2d 226, 232 (La. 2000).
59. See Bockman v. Caraway, 691 So. 2d 815 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997) (expert affidavits are not
admissible at summary judgment); Barnett v. Staats, 631 So. 2d 84 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994) (affidavits
and depositions of experts as to opinion do not meet personal knowledge requirement); McCoy v.
Physicians & Surgeons Hosp., Inc., 452 So. 2d 308 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984), writ denied, 457 So. 2d
1194 (La. 1984) (expert affidavits and depositions do not meet the personal knowledge requirement and
NOTES2001]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
circuit cases have admitted expert affidavits in support of motions for summary
judgment.60
The only appellate court to defy the majority rule [consistently] wasthe fourth
circuit In that jurisdiction, judges regularly allowed expert opinion in support of
motions for summary judgment.6" In fact, in one decision the court went so far
as to say, "[ain expert opinion... .derived from scientific/medical data....is more a
statement of fact based on personal knowledge acquired through research and
experience.... There is no firm line between opinion and fact."'62 However, rather than
directlyrefute the notion that the personal knowledge requirement ofArticle 967 applied
to expert opinion, the opinions of the fourth circuit typically circumvented the majority
rule by noting characteristics that distinguished its cases from those of other circuits.63
Contrary to the unsettled status of the Louisiana jurisprudence prior to
Independent Fire, federal courts have customarily admitted expert opinion testimony
in the form of affidavits and. depositions at summary judgment." Although Federal
Rule 56(e) includes a personal knowledge requirementthat is identical to Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure article 967, 6 federalcourts do not impose this constraint
on expert testimony Instead, federalcourts apply a single rule for expert testimony
admissibility, the Daubert "gatekeeper" test," at summary judgment hearings and
at trials.
67
II. THE INDEPENDENTFiRE DECISION
A. Justice Victory's Victory
Writing for the majority, Justice Victory torched the notion that Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure article 967, with its requirement that affidavits supporting or opposing a
are therefore inadmissible at summary judgment).
60. See Gardner on Behalf of Gardner v. Louisiana State Univ. Med. Ctr. in Shreveport, 702 So.
2d 53 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997); Bailey v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 665 So. 2d 664 (La. App. 2d Cir
1995), writ denied, 668 So. 2d 372 (La. 1996).
61. See Buffa v. Lawrence's Bakery, Inc., 615 So. 2d 418 (La. App 4th Cir. 1993) (allowing
expert affidavit because it "include[d] facts derived from his own personal observation and inspection
of plaintiffs' property as well as his opinion as a professional"); Richoux v. Tulane Medical Ctr., 617
So. 2d 13, 16 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993) (admitting expert testimony of medical review panel at summary
judgment).
62. Obiago v. Merrell-National Laboratory, Inc., 560 So. 2d 625,627-28 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990),
writ denied, 565 So. 2d 445 (La. 1990).
63. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 61-62.
64. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4; Ruffin v. Shaw lndus., Inc., 149 F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 1998)
(holding that because an expert opinion would be admissible at trial under Daubert, it is admissible on
a motion for summary judgment); Hayes v. Douglas Dynamics, Inc., 8 F.3d 88 (1st Cir 1993) (stating
that "the evidentiary rules were not intended... to make summary judgment impossible whenever a party
has produced an expert to support its position").
65. See supra note 46.
66. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).




motion for sunmryjudgmentbe made onpersonal knowledge, precludes expert opinion
testimony from consideration at summary judgment proceedings.68 In the course of his
opinion, Justice Victory described the split in the Louisiana appellate courts. He also
noted that federal court decisions concerning the admissibility of expert testimony at
summary judgment were construing a statutorypersonal knowledge requirement that was
textually identical to that of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 967.69 The court
observedthatthe federal courts routinely consider expert testimony at sunmryjudgment




Justice Victory took notice of the United States Supreme Court's lack of
interest in the personal knowledge requirement of Rule 56(e) in Daubert.72 His
opinion referred to the Daubert Court's emphasis on Rule 702's "helpfulness"
standard as evidence of an exception to the firsthand knowledge requirement that
binds the testimony of an ordinary witness." Indeed, according to Justice Victory,
Daubert stood for the proposition that experts who meet the requirements of Rule
702 are not subject to the lay witness's firsthand/personal knowledge requirement
at summary judgment or at trial; thus, experts may rely upon hearsay in supporting
testimony.74
Finally, Justice Victory's opinion noted that the Louisiana Supreme Court had
previously elected to follow the Daubert ruling in adopting general expert
admissibility standards in State v. Foret.75 There, the court determined that because
much of the Louisiana Code of Evidence was patterned after the Federal Rules of
Evidence (in an attempt to facilitate a more uniform national law of evidence),
Louisiana courts should use the body of federal authorities because it may be
instructive in interpreting the Louisiana code.76 Furthermore, the Foret decision
concluded that because the Louisiana Code of Evidence provision on expert
evidence is identical to the federal rule, Louisiana should follow the established
federal standard.77 Citing the principle of deference established in Foret, the
similarity between Article 966 and Rule 56, and the fact that Louisiana adopted the
68. Id. at 235.
69. Id. at 232.
70. Id. (citing sources supra notes 4 and 69).
71. Daubert involved a plaintiff seeking to oppose a defendant's motion for summary judgment
with expert opinion testimony. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because the federal
circuits were split regarding the proper standard for the admission of expert testimony. The Daubert
opinion took no notice of the personal knowledge requirement. Instead, the Court focused on the
application of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to the general question of admissibility of expert testimony,
implicitly assuming that expert opinion evidence admissible at trial would also be admissible at
summary judgment.
72. Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam, Corp., 755 So. 2d 226, 233 (La. 2000).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 628 So. 2d 1116, 1122-23 (La. 1993).




federal courts' more liberal summary judgment standard in Hardy v. Bowie,78 the
court extended the adoption of the Daubert standards to summary judgment
proceedings. 9
B. Examining the Court's Rationale
The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Independent Fire represents a
major change in the law governing the admissibility of expert opinion evidence at
summary judgment proceedings in Louisiana. By holding that Article 967 of the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure does not preclude expert opinion testimony from
consideration in summary judgment hearings, 0 the court resolved an issue of
dispute between the circuits and brought Louisiana law in line with the federal
jurisprudence. This development in the law constitutes progress for reasons
discussed below but is not without costs.
1. Legislative Intent
Adherence to legislative intent proved central to the Louisiana Supreme
Court's decision in Independent Fire to overturn Louisiana circuit jurisprudence
denying expert testimony at summary judgment. By adopting the federal
jurisprudential rule, the court squared the law with the intent of redactors of the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure and the drafters of Louisiana Code of Evidence,
both of whom sought uniformity with federal procedure.8 As the similarities in the
articles' text suggest, the drafters of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure based
Articles 966 and 967 on Federal Rule 56.82 In fact, Article 967 comment (a),
describes the statutory duplication by stating "[t]his article is substantially the same
as Fed Rule 56(e)-(g)." Furthermore, official comments to the Louisiana Code of
Evidence assert that the Legislature also patterned Article 702 after its federal
counterpart, Rule 702, in an attempt to facilitate a "movement towards a uniform
national law of evidence." 3 Clearly, these comments suggest that the Legislature
sought procedural uniformity with federal standards when they adopted Articles
966, 967 and 702. That being the case, the deferential Independent Fire decision
serves legislative intent by promoting uniformity in admission of evidence at
summary judgment.
The view that experts are not subject to the personal knowledge requirement
is sound based on the United States Supreme Court's rule in Daubert. However,
78. 744 So. 2d 606, 610 (La. 1999).
79. Independent Fire Ins. Co., 755 So. 2d at 234.
80. Id. at 237.
81. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 967, comment (a) (1984); La. Code. Evid. art 102, comment (a)
(1995).
82. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 966, comment (b) (1984) (comparing La. Code Civ. P. art. 966 to
Rule 56); La. Code Civ. P. art. 967, comment (b) (1984) (referring to the comments of La. Code Civ.
P. art. 966).
83. La. Code. Evid. art 102, comment (a) (1995).
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this theory rests upon either the assumption that the authors of Article 967 did not
intend it to apply to experts, or that if they did, an exception was created in Article
702. The Independent Fire opinion first addressed the issue of drafters' intent with
this reference to the doctrine: "It is doubtful that the redactors of the Code had
experts in mind when they used the term 'personal knowledge."' ' 4 Indeed, the
opinion points out that Article 967 was passed in 1960, long before the dramatic
increase in the use of expert opinion evidence." Since then, the Legislature crafted
Article 702, which allows an expert to testify to matters about which they have no
personal knowledge by virtue of his or her knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education."
Although the opinion did not elaborate on the preceding argument, the
inference to be drawn is that because experts were so seldom used when Article 967
was last revised, it is doubtful that the Legislature contemplated expert testimony
when drafting the article's personal knowledge requirement. An alternate
conclusion is that even if the redactors did intend the personal knowledge
requirement to apply to experts, the more recent law-Article 702-abrogates
Article 967. A counter-argument to this interpretation is that Article 967, because
it refers only to affidavits, is more specific than Article 702 and thus abrogates the
more general provision. However, considering the historical development of the
articles alongside the legal maxim, lex posterior derogat anterior,87 the better
conclusion to draw is that the personal knowledge requirement of Article 967 does
not apply to experts.
2. Deference to Federal Jurisprudence
Adopting the Daubert rationale serves the practical purpose of furnishing lower
courts with a wealth of potentially enlightening federal case law on the procedure
of admitting expert opinion testimony at summary judgment. By stating and
adhering to a goal of evidence law uniformity, the Louisiana supreme court has
implicitly endorsed evidence rules established in federal jurisprudence. It follows
that federal rules demarcating areas of evidence law not yet resolved in Louisiana
should be highly persuasive authorities.
Encouraging deference to federal jurisprudence when interpreting Louisiana
evidence law no doubt alarms the ranks ofLouisiana attorneys and judges dedicated
to the proposition that Louisiana possesses the sovereignty necessary to decide its
own evidence standards. To comfort such discontent, ardent federalists should
comprehend that the Independent Fire principle of interpretation did not surrender
any of Louisiana's power to govern the procedure of its court system. Rather, the
state, acting through its supreme court, exercised that autonomy by choosing to
84. Independent Fire Ins. Co., 755 So. 2d at 235 (quoting Maraist & Lemmon, supra note 21, §
6.8, at 145).
85. Independent Fire Ins. Co., 755 So. 2d at 235.
86. Id.
87. See La. Civ. Code art. 8 (1999).
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pursue uniformity in evidence law. The legislature, the Louisiana supreme court,
and even lower courts remain capable of creating evidence law that contradicts
federal standards.
3. Judicial Economy
The driving force behind the summary judgment proceeding and the
Independent Fire decision is judicial economy. The purpose of summaryjudgment
is to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.""8
Independent Fire, like the aforementioned amendments which replaced the
"cautious and sparingly" standard with a "favored" status, aimed to better facilitate
summary judgment's docket-clearing effect in cases which fail to show a genuine
issue as to a material fact. Determining the likely effect of the Independent Fire
holding upon judicial economy begins with ascertaining whether the new rule will
result in more summary judgments.
At first glance, the new rule allowing expert testimony at summary judgment
seems to supply defendants with an opportunity to halt litigation in its early stages
with scientific and/or technical testimony at summary judgment. Such a change in
the law should result in an increased amount of summary judgments, especially in
cases where defense experts are used to prove a lack of causation evidence.
However, several factors should limit the new rule's effect of increasing summary
judgments.
First, because the trial judge must refrain from making credibility calls89 and
must draw inferences from undisputed facts most favorable to the party opposing
the motion,9" plaintiffs opposing a motion for summary judgment may defeat the
motion by submitting contradictory expert testimony, thereby creating a genuine
issue of material fact.9 Given the availability of "professional" expert witnesses
who are willing to testify in conformity with the needs of the advocate who hires
them,92 shrewd parties opposing a motion for summary judgment should be able to
field contradictory expert testimony. Deadlock will result, creating a genuine issue
of material fact. Consequently, the Independent Fire rule will not lead to a
substantial increase in summary judgments. By admitting expert testimony at
summary judgment while reversing a lower court's judgment granting the motion,
the Independent Fire decision provides a noteworthy example of countervailing
expert testimony prohibiting the new rule from leading to more summary
judgments.
88. La. Code Civ P. art. 966 (1984).
89. See Sportsman Store of Lake Charles, Inc. v. Sonitrol Security Systems of Calcasieu, Inc., 748
So. 2d 417 (La. 1999).
90. Maraist & Lemmon, supra note 21, § 6.8, at 145.
91. Edward Brunet, The Use and Misuse of Expert Testimony in Summary Judgment, 22 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 93 (1988).
92. For an excellent discussion of the "professional" expert issue, see W. Raley Alford, Comment,
The Biased Expert Witness in Louisiana Tort Law: Existing Mechanisms of Control and Proposals for
Change, 61 La. L Rev. 181 (2001).
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Second, considering that Celotex established that summary judgments are to
be granted when the plaintiff cannot prove an element of his case (rather than when
the defendant has ample evidence to disprove a claim), Independent Fire creates a
new avenue for the plaintiff to effectively oppose summary judgment.
4. Fairness
The Independent Fire opinion also cites equity and logic as additional reasons
why the court adopted the federal rule.9" To establish these concepts as support for
the court's decision, Justice Victory began by creating a hypothetical that describes
a situation under the majority circuit rule in which a party who has eyewitness
testimony obtains summary judgment against a party who does not possess
eyewitness evidence but does hold expert opinion evidence that, if considered,
would controvert the eyewitness testimony.94 The court's opinion claims that,
under the appellate majority rule, the party with only the expert evidence would
lose at summary judgment because his expert's testimony is not based on personal
knowledge, even though he might have prevailed at trial.9" Justice Victory's
opinion asserts that such an outcome would be both "inequitable and illogical" '96
and implies that such outcomes would not result under the federal rule.
This hypothetical represents a persuasive appeal to logic and fairness if one
observes the implied assumption that the mentioned eyewitness and expert
testimony are the only evidence submitted at the summary judgment hearing. If
that assumption is accepted, then the hypothetical decision is illogical because it
produces a different outcome-exclusion of evidence-than the one that would
result if a similar conflict would arise at trial, where the expert testimony is
admissible. This is inequitable because it arbitrarily excludes evidence that could
prove a party's claim or defense while permitting the evidence of his opponent.
Independent Fire promotes logic and equity by eliminating such a questionable
result; however, this protection is narrow. If one assumes that each party submitted
accompanying evidence sufficient to raise a dispute as to the material facts, the law
would not call for the result the hypothetical commands-granting of the summary
judgment-because a dispute would exist as to the material facts.
To further support the equitable nature of the decision, the Independent Fire
opinion concludes by reinforcing four previously unmentioned "important
underlying principles" ofsummaryjudgment. The first two listed principles protect
the jury's role as trier in fact. First, the trial judge cannot make credibility
determinations on a motion for summary judgment.97 Second, the trial court must
not attempt to evaluate the persuasiveness of competing scientific studies. In
performing its Daubert-Foret gatekeeping analysis at summary judgment, the court




97. Id. See Sportsman Store of Lake Charles, Inc. v. Sonitrol Security Systems of Calcasieu, Inc.,
748 So. 2d 417 (La. 1999).
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must focus on principles of methodology of the experts rather than the conclusions
they generate." The effect of prohibiting the trial judge from making judgments
as to the credibility and persuasiveness of expert testimony is to ensure that the
trier of fact, instead of the trial court, decides the issues as to the facts. These two
"important underlying principles" provide perhaps the best defense to the visceral
claim that admhitting expert testimony at summary judgment potentially unfairly
deprives a litigant of his or her day in court. To be admitted, expert evidence first
must pass the reliability and relevance "gates" imposed by the Daubert-Foret
standards, which focus on methodology rather than result. Assuming that a party
moving for summary judgment presents expert testimony that meets the Daubert-
Foret criteria, the nonmoving party can still ensure a trial on the merits by
presenting contradictory Daubert-proof expert testimony. The resulting trial on
the merits is guaranteed by the prohibition on credibility calls at summary
judgment. Because the trial court cannot determine the credibility of the opposing
experts, an issue on the facts exists which should prohibit the granting of summary
judgment."I
The third principle outlined by Justice Victory requires that the court must
draw those inferences from the undisputed facts that are most favorable to the
party opposing the motion."° Finally, Justice Victory labeled as most important
the rule that summary judgment should only be granted when the evidence
presented establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute.'
As the first two principles did, the latter two serve to protect a litigant's
entitlement to a trial on the merits, seeking to guarantee a trial on the merits so
long as a genuine issue of material fact exists.
While these principles provide safeguards for plaintiffs seeking to avoid
summary judgment, they also demarcate the gains made by the defense bar in
Independent Fire. Although Independent Fire should not lead to a significant
increase in summary judgments, the decision will likely lead to increased litigation
costs due to the "expertification" of the summary judgment process. The initial
critique of such a claim is that costs are not increased, but rather merely hastened,
because experts hired at summary judgment will eventually be needed at trial.
This contention would be true but for the fact that an overwhelming majority of
litigation is settled prior to trial. Summary judgment is a critical stage in the
settlement process. Even if Independent Fire has not significantly heightened the
danger to plaintiffs that summary motions will be granted,. the decision has driven
up the costs of opposing such a motion. Such an increase surely benefits the
bargaining stance of the party seeking summary judgment. Furthermore, as with
all increases in the costs of litigation, the new rule is most likely to prejudice the
poorest of litigants.
98. Independent Fire Ins. Co., 755 So. 2d at 235 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 n.6,113 S. Ct.
at 2786).
99. Brunet, supra note 92, at 93.





In addition to driving up litigation costs, the Independent Fire decision
intensifies the trial court's burden of determining whether expert testimony meets
Daubert-Foret standards because summary judgment supplies less security against
unhelpful expert evidence than trial on the merits. 2 Unlike summary judgment,
trial offers immediate cross-examinatiqn as an agent for tempering an expert's
testimony and attacking credibility. This element of trial allows opposing counsel
to instantly confront and correct an expert witness. While Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 967 provides for analogous confrontation devices such as
supplemental affidavits and depositions, 3 it is unlikely that such procedures will
eliminate unreliable expert testimony as effectively as trial methods.'"
The primary reason that summary judgment procedure offers less protection
than the trial standard is that it allows for a lapse in time before requiring response
and therefore enables experts to evade questions that would be effective in
conventional cross-examination."' One argument countering this point focuses on
the fact that, unlike live cross-examination, the delay-filled summary judgment
process allows the party opposing an expert extra time to carefully plan an attack
on the expert testimony. A second counter-argument points out that Article 967
allows for live cross-examination in depositions to supplement the motion for
summary judgment. The problem, though, with expecting depositions to provide
a cross-examination analogous to that of trials is that such a view incorrectly
assumes that lawyers approach a deposition cross-examination as they would a
trial cross-examination. The two encounters are not equivalent because lawyers
seeking to capitalize off of suspense and surprise save their most scorching
questions for trial. Because tactical concerns often require lawyers to save their
best attacks for the jury, supplemental affidavits, depositions, and interrogatory
answers fail to provide an amount of protection against unhelpful testimony equal
to cross-examination at trial. This hinders the trial court's Daubert-Foret
determination.
III. CONCLUSION
Without a doubt, the Independent Fire standard of allowing expert testimony
at summary judgment effects a significant change to Louisiana's law of evidence
and procedure. Primarily because the decision satisfies legislative intent, but also
because it promotes uniformity, the decision represents a positive shift. However,
since Independent Fire fails to significantly alleviate the judicial economy, affects
102. Brunet, supra note 92, at 134.
103. La. Code Civ. P. art. 967 provides that "[t]he court may permit affidavits to be supplemented
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or by further affidavits."
104. Brunet, supra note 92, at 134.
105. Id.
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poor litigants most adversely by increasing and hastening the costs of litigation,
and hinders the Daubert-Foret determination, its smoky ashes cloud this decision's
flame of progress.
J. Parker Layrisson"
* The author wishes to thank Professor Frank L Maraist for his careful guidance and generous
encouragement in advising this paper.
